Publications |
In Hegel and Capitalism, edited by Andrew Buchwalter, 101-16. Albany: SUNY Press, 2015.
Abstract: Hegel’s ambitious aim in political philosophy is to demonstrate the rationality of the basic institutions of modern society. The tendency of markets to generate poverty, he recognizes, represents an obstacle to the fulfillment of this aim. The scholarly literature continues to be divided on whether Hegel does—or even can—overcome this obstacle. In this chapter, I defend a constraint upon any affirmative answer to this question. I begin by asking what is problematic about poverty as a condition affecting individual members of modern society. I highlight the distinctiveness of Hegel’s normative conception of poverty by contrasting it with Kant’s. For Kant, poverty is problematic because it constitutes a condition in which a person stands in a wrongful relation of dependence to other persons. For Hegel, poverty is problematic for a much more fundamental reason: because it constitutes a condition in which a human being is structurally prevented from realizing her capacity for autonomous personality in the first place. I argue that Hegel’s ambitious aim can succeed only if he can show that modern society has at its disposal remedial measures that would make it possible for individuals to escape a condition in which their development of autonomous personality is structurally frustrated. with Leigh Raymond. Environmental Politics 19, no. 1 (2010): 86-106.
Abstract: The precautionary principle has gained influence in environmental politics as a ‘policy principle’--an idea that can spur policy change. Yet, exact definitions of the principle remain elusive, making evaluation of its actual political influence difficult. Given the controversy over its meaning and policy utility, broader empirical analysis of its public formulations is overdue. Elite discourse on the precautionary principle is analyzed in the search for a dominant formulation among 238 articles in a variety of disciplines. The modal formulation is found to be a mix of stronger and weaker elements, broadly resembling Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. The data suggest that the principle has become weaker over time, and that its critics formulate it more strongly than proponents. Contrary to some assertions, however, American and European authors do not differ significantly in their interpretations of the principle. |
Book reviews |
In Kantian Review 23, no. 4 (2018): 681-7.
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